Addiction and Weakness of Will Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, 160pp., ISBN 978-0-19-964196-3
This monograph develops an Aristotelian conception of autonomous agency by focusing on limit cases, such as addiction and weakness of will. It offers a unified view of responsibility for actions and attitudes bringing together insights from volitional and non-volitional accounts.
"A dense and serious exploration of foundational issues in moral psychology, with an eye most especially on the conditions under which agents are morally responsible for their behaviour...Specialists in moral responsibility and moral psychology will benefit considerably from reading Radoilska's view, especially her sustained criticisms of accounts that currently dominate the landscape".
Neil Levy, Australian Research Council and Oxford University, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2014).
This monograph develops an Aristotelian conception of autonomous agency by focusing on limit cases, such as addiction and weakness of will. It offers a unified view of responsibility for actions and attitudes bringing together insights from volitional and non-volitional accounts.
"A dense and serious exploration of foundational issues in moral psychology, with an eye most especially on the conditions under which agents are morally responsible for their behaviour...Specialists in moral responsibility and moral psychology will benefit considerably from reading Radoilska's view, especially her sustained criticisms of accounts that currently dominate the landscape".
Neil Levy, Australian Research Council and Oxford University, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2014).
Aristotle in Moral Philosophy (L'Actualité d'Aristote en morale) Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2007, 308pp., ISBN 978-2-13-056176-7
This monograph provides a critical examination of autonomy in connection to moral knowledge. Drawing on Aristotle’s moral psychology, it is argued that moral judgments aim at knowledge; however, this does not undermine their action-guiding character.
"This is an extremely interesting work on a topical subject; the arguments are developed in a lucid and insightful way."
Marco Zingano, University of Sao Paolo, Revue Philosophique de Louvain 108 (2010).
Also reviewed in: Revue Philosophique 133 (2008).
This monograph provides a critical examination of autonomy in connection to moral knowledge. Drawing on Aristotle’s moral psychology, it is argued that moral judgments aim at knowledge; however, this does not undermine their action-guiding character.
"This is an extremely interesting work on a topical subject; the arguments are developed in a lucid and insightful way."
Marco Zingano, University of Sao Paolo, Revue Philosophique de Louvain 108 (2010).
Also reviewed in: Revue Philosophique 133 (2008).
Autonomy and Mental Disorder Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 320pp., ISBN: 978-0-19-959542-6
By considering instances of mental disorders where autonomy is apparently compromised, this anthology identifies and explores different kinds of emerging scepticism about autonomy and its significance.
"[This collection]...shifts the parameters of the debate in important ways, by opening up new lines of inquiry, asking new and different questions, and forcing us to consider many long held assumptions. This is a rich, diverse and engaging collection of essays that would be of immense use to researchers and clinicians."
Sarah Sorial, University of Wollongong, Metapsychology Online Reviews 17:52 (2013).
Also reviewed in: European Journal of Philosophy 2014; Metascience 22(2) 2013; The British Journal of Psychiatry 202 (2013);
Philosophy in Review 33:3 (2013); Journal of Clinical Psychiatry April 2013.
By considering instances of mental disorders where autonomy is apparently compromised, this anthology identifies and explores different kinds of emerging scepticism about autonomy and its significance.
"[This collection]...shifts the parameters of the debate in important ways, by opening up new lines of inquiry, asking new and different questions, and forcing us to consider many long held assumptions. This is a rich, diverse and engaging collection of essays that would be of immense use to researchers and clinicians."
Sarah Sorial, University of Wollongong, Metapsychology Online Reviews 17:52 (2013).
Also reviewed in: European Journal of Philosophy 2014; Metascience 22(2) 2013; The British Journal of Psychiatry 202 (2013);
Philosophy in Review 33:3 (2013); Journal of Clinical Psychiatry April 2013.