About Me
I work at the intersection of ethics, the philosophy of action, and epistemology, with long-standing research interests in legal and political philosophy and Ancient Greek thought.
My research develops a distinctive Aristotelian approach to agency, focusing on core concepts such as autonomy and responsibility, and applying these to topics including moral luck, epistemic injustice, and mental disorder. I aim to show how a relational and ecological understanding of individual and group agency can illuminate both moral and epistemic practices.
I am currently Honorary Professor of Philosophy at the University of Kent, where I was Professor of Philosophy until August 2024, and Visiting Researcher at the Cambridge Forum for Legal and Political Philosophy. I also serve as Editor-in-Chief of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice and as Network Lead for “Norms of Action and Belief” at St Catherine’s College, Oxford.
My earlier appointments include positions at the Universities of Cambridge, Geneva, Johannesburg and LMU-Munich, and I have served on the Executive Committee of the Society for Women in Philosophy (UK) and the Advisory Board of the British Society for Ethical Theory.
Current projects include:
• Habits, Agency and Responsibility
• Knowledge Co-creation, Lived Experience, and the Values of Inquiry
• Epistemic Privilege and Epistemic Justice
I work at the intersection of ethics, the philosophy of action, and epistemology, with long-standing research interests in legal and political philosophy and Ancient Greek thought.
My research develops a distinctive Aristotelian approach to agency, focusing on core concepts such as autonomy and responsibility, and applying these to topics including moral luck, epistemic injustice, and mental disorder. I aim to show how a relational and ecological understanding of individual and group agency can illuminate both moral and epistemic practices.
I am currently Honorary Professor of Philosophy at the University of Kent, where I was Professor of Philosophy until August 2024, and Visiting Researcher at the Cambridge Forum for Legal and Political Philosophy. I also serve as Editor-in-Chief of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice and as Network Lead for “Norms of Action and Belief” at St Catherine’s College, Oxford.
My earlier appointments include positions at the Universities of Cambridge, Geneva, Johannesburg and LMU-Munich, and I have served on the Executive Committee of the Society for Women in Philosophy (UK) and the Advisory Board of the British Society for Ethical Theory.
Current projects include:
• Habits, Agency and Responsibility
• Knowledge Co-creation, Lived Experience, and the Values of Inquiry
• Epistemic Privilege and Epistemic Justice
Recent publications:
Moral Competence and Mental Disorder. In Kiener, M. (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Responsibility. Routledge, Abingdon, UK, pp. 287- 298
Is Grit Irrational for Akratic Agents? In: McKearney, P. and N.H. Evans (eds.) Against Better Judgment: Akrasia in Anthropological Perspective. Berghahn Books, Oxford, pp. 146-168.
Autonomy and Responsibility. In: Colburn, B. (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Autonomy. Routledge, Abingdon, UK, pp. 147-157.
Epistemic justice is both a legitimate and an integral goal of psychiatry: a reply to Kious, Lewis and Kim (with D Foreman). Psychological Medicine 53(14): 6939-6940
Moral Competence and Mental Disorder. In Kiener, M. (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Responsibility. Routledge, Abingdon, UK, pp. 287- 298
Is Grit Irrational for Akratic Agents? In: McKearney, P. and N.H. Evans (eds.) Against Better Judgment: Akrasia in Anthropological Perspective. Berghahn Books, Oxford, pp. 146-168.
Autonomy and Responsibility. In: Colburn, B. (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Autonomy. Routledge, Abingdon, UK, pp. 147-157.
Epistemic justice is both a legitimate and an integral goal of psychiatry: a reply to Kious, Lewis and Kim (with D Foreman). Psychological Medicine 53(14): 6939-6940