IMMIGRATION, INTERPERSONAL TRUST, AND NATIONAL CULTURE

Is sharing a national identity required for interpersonal trust in a democratic welfare state? If so, what would be the implications for defining a cogent set of liberal immigration policies? More specifically, should immigrant groups be expected to integrate into existing national cultures and what is the best way to conceptualise this expectation? The present article will aim to elucidate these issues by offering a critical analysis of David Miller’s recent proposal, according to which liberal immigration policies should be conceptualised in terms of a quasi-contract between receiving nations and immigrant groups. This quasi-contract is meant to ensure that cultural diversity due to mass immigration does not undermine trust among citizens whilst at the same time immigrants are treated fairly. It will be argued that Miller’s proposal fails to sufficiently address two related concerns. Firstly, by being open-ended, a quasi-contractual requirement for cultural integration leaves immigrant groups open to arbitrary critique for being insufficiently integrated and so unworthy of trust as citizens of their adopted countries. Secondly, by focusing on national culture and not citizenship, Miller’s proposal inadvertently makes political membership appear as secondary in the discussion of political trustworthiness. To motivate this conclusion, I look into two major models of interpersonal trust, affective and cognitive, and show that there is no room for a mid-way position consistent with a notion of a quasi-contract. I then identify and explore an effect of grounding political trust in a shared national culture instead of democratic institutions, which is to normalise the domination of immigrants and citizens alike.

Miller on Immigration and Political Trustworthiness

In his article ‘Immigrants, nations, and citizenship’ (2008), David Miller identifies the big question about immigration as ‘whether citizenship alone is a sufficiently strong cement to hold together a democratic welfare state, whose successful working depends upon relatively high levels of interpersonal trust and co-operation, or whether it is also necessary for the citizens to share a cultural identity of the kind that common nationality provides’ (p.378). Building on earlier works,1 Miller argues for the second position, citizenship as political membership only is insufficient to guarantee social cohesion within a democratic welfare

state. With respect to immigrants, this position seems to imply further requirements, in addition to obeying the laws of the state they join and accepting the basic principles of liberal democracy which underlie its public life. These requirements are meant to ensure that immigrants integrate within the existing national culture to a degree that allows them to partake in a shared identity with the native-born citizens. The objective is to avoid the dilution of interpersonal trust, which Miller considers to prevail in culturally divided societies where support for a democratic welfare state is generally weakened and particularly problematic in the case of redistributive policies across cultural or ethnic lines. Drawing on evidence from the US and some other multicultural democracies (p. 379–380), Miller suggests that the cultural integration of immigrants is essential if liberal democracies are to maintain their commitment to upholding the social rights of citizenship. For, if some immigrant groups are seen as poorly integrated within the national culture, the rest of the citizens would be reluctant to support redistributive policies that would benefit these groups. The thought seems to be that by staying out of the mainstream culture immigrants would not only make themselves untrustworthy qua citizens in the eyes of the national majority. This would also contribute to the overall weakening of the fabric of society.

Miller is quick to point out that his argument does not assign a merely passive role to immigrants. He writes: ‘In arguing that immigrants should be expected to integrate culturally and accept elements of the existing national culture, I do not mean to exclude their contribution to the reshaping of that culture, a process that happens in any case, but ideally should do so through open debate between different sections of the national community’ (p. 387). This is consistent with the underlying ambition of his project, which is to find a midway between two contrasting positions on immigration within liberalism, the one focusing exclusively on the idea of national sovereignty and the other on the human rights of the immigrants (p. 389). This ambition is expressed in the idea of a quasi-contract between the citizens of the receiving state and new immigrant groups, which according to Miller should be fair to both sides (p. 371–372). Arrangements that benefit the receiving nation at the expense of immigrants discussed in his paper fit into three main categories: first, an expectation that immigrants completely assimilate to the cultural patterns of the society they join; second, the selection of immigrants on grounds of their ethnicity or perceived cultural proximity; and third, the default treatment of immigrants as untrustworthy. An example of the first category is the so-called ‘Tebbit test’ demanding that ‘immigrant groups from Commonwealth countries cheer for the English team and not for their countries of origin
when watching cricket matches’ (p. 372). The second category is illustrated by a survey of popular attitudes to immigration in the Netherlands indicating that the majority would favour a cultural fit criterion for new immigrants, which Miller considers to be implicitly reliant on a ‘too-rigid conception of national culture’ (p. 388). Finally, the arrests of people of German origin in the UK and people of Japanese origin in the US during World War II are instances of the third category, default treatment of immigrants as untrustworthy by the state. According to Miller, these instances were particularly prejudicial since ‘many of those interned were in fact strongly committed to their adopted countries, and equally antagonistic to the countries they left’ (p. 383). Thus, by reflecting on the wrongness of state distrust levelled at trustworthy immigrants, Miller is able to make the following general point (ibid.):

The state should act toward immigrants on the basis that they are committed citizens, until in the case of any particular individual there is clear evidence to the contrary.

Could the mid-way position on immigration outlined by Miller avoid a default assumption that immigrants are untrustworthy citizens merely by virtue of being immigrants? This question is pressing since, at a closer look, the three categories of cases whereby immigrants are allowed to join in on inequitable terms exhibit a common underlying structure. Both a requirement for complete assimilation to the national culture and a selection of immigrants on grounds of cultural proximity seem to reiterate, in their own ways, the response to immigration which is expressed in a default attitude of distrust. In a nutshell, this response can be put as follows: to the extent that immigrants are identifiable as such, as opposed to blend in, they are not an integral part of the nation. And so, the question: ‘Whose side are they really on?’ would seem to be an acceptable thing to ask in a variety of situations, from the mundane to the critical, from the cricket pitch to the battlefield.

Admittedly, this is the kind of pitfall that Miller’s conception of a quasi-contract between receiving nations and immigrant groups is meant to pre-empt.\(^2\) For if a state is reluctant to acknowledge some groups as sufficiently integrated within the established culture unless they are also completely assimilated to it, this would create a powerful disincentive to their being committed citizens to this state. A good illustration of the attitude to beware of is offered by

\(^2\) This paper will be focused on instances when the quasi-contract benefits a receiving nation to the detriment of immigrant groups. Instances of the opposite kind of one-sidedness, i.e. quasi-contracts that disadvantage a receiving nation by being too favourable to immigrant groups will not be given separate consideration: firstly, because these two kinds of possible imbalance raise separate sets of conceptual issues; and secondly, because quasi-contracts favouring immigrants over receiving nations are less likely given the balance of power between parties involved. On this latter point, see for instance Carens (1987).
an episode in E.M. Forester’s *A Passage to India*. There, Ronny Heaslop remarks to Adela Quested on the subject of their mutual acquaintance, Dr Aziz:

He shook his head laughing.
‘Have I said anything funny?’
‘I was only thinking how the worthy doctor’s collar climbed up his neck.’
‘I thought you were discussing the caves.’
‘So I am. Aziz was exquisitely dressed, from tie-pin to spats, but he had forgotten his back-collar stud, and there you have the Indian all over…

(Forrester 1924, p. 82)

Clearly, if the requirement that immigrants integrate culturally takes the form of fault-finding for not achieving the impossible – in the eyes of Ronny Heaslop Dr Aziz will never be a perfect gentleman or ‘one of us’ – immigrants will be effectively prevented from sharing a national identity with native-born citizens. As a result, the social cohesion and levels of interpersonal trust required for a well-functioning democracy would be as fragile as in cases when no cultural integration is expected at all, over and above the minimal understanding of a country’s public life that enables newcomers to respect its laws.

There are two features of Miller’s position that might be seen as problematic in this respect. First, according to Miller, the requirement that immigrants integrate culturally – albeit normative – ‘cannot be sensibly cast in legal form’ (2008, p. 371). This conceptualisation seems intuitively appealing; it flows directly from the notion of a quasi-contract between receiving nations and immigrant groups. Drawing on the literature on the ethics of trust (e.g. Baier 1986, Jones 1996), we can appreciate why a less than fully formalised kind of interaction might be considered as conducive to trust between parties: it provides them with space for the expression of goodwill toward one another. However, this effect is typical of already established trusting relationships. It tells us how to sustain such relationships, not how to initiate them. In the absence of a secure grounding, less than fully specified expectations might be experienced as deliberately vague and even oppressive: one can never be sure to have lived up to such expectations. If the requirement that immigrants integrate culturally is not spelled out so that everyone can be clear about whether this has been fulfilled or not, it is difficult to see how a sneering attitude like the one exposed by E.M. Forester in the character of Ronny Heaslop is to be avoided in the midst of the receiving nation. As I shall argue in the following section, failing to address this concern is likely to lead to a

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3 See also Southwood (2011, p. 765ff.), which drew my attention to the philosophical interest of this passage.
political circumstance of self-fulfilling distrust between national majorities and immigrant groups. If these majorities feel free to recast the boundaries between insiders and outsiders of the national culture at their discretion, immigrants are liable to find themselves casually treated as outsiders irrespective of how committed citizens they are trying to be. It would therefore be unsurprising if some of them felt disaffected with a national identity which does not seem to be firmly acknowledged as theirs, but can be challenged at will. In turn, such disaffection would feed into the image of immigrants as potentially untrustworthy and uncommitted citizens.

Second, the quasi-contractual requirements levelled at immigrant groups are tied in with national identity rather than citizenship. To see why this is problematic, let us consider again the arrests of people of Japanese origin in the US during World War II. The policy did not distinguish between new arrivals in the country and citizens, even native-born citizens of a particular ethnic background. By identifying them collectively as ‘people of Japanese origin’, the preventive mass detention, to which they were all subjected, demonstrated the insignificance of the US citizenship many of them held in the eyes of the US state. This goes to the heart of the problem: if political trustworthiness is grounded in sharing a cultural identity rather than membership in a political community, the defensible divide between citizens of the receiving nation and immigrant groups is likely to shift into a pernicious one, between dominant and marginalised groups of citizens. For it is hard to see how a process of cultural integration as that advanced by Miller – learning the national language, some aspects of the nation’s history and political culture (p.380) – would counteract this pernicious outcome. As shown by the preventive detention of people of Japanese origin in the US during World War II, the perception of a group as politically untrustworthy seems to be primarily targeted at a feature which identifies members of the group as different from the national majority: ethnic background, some religious or cultural practice. Whether they have integrated into the national culture in the sense specified by Miller’s mid-way position seems immaterial in this respect. The very fact of having a group identity in addition to the national one seems sufficient to trigger this kind of suspicion. Just as the vagueness of integration requirements placed on immigrant groups by a quasi-contract with the receiving nation, the focus on national identity as opposed to citizenship has the potential to place arbitrary constraints and to contribute to the arbitrary exclusion of citizens associated with these groups. As Philip Cole observes:
The citizens/subjects boundary is based on a distinction between activities, not people: those activities proper to the public sphere of political citizenship. The citizens/outsiders boundary is based on a distinction between people, but in practice it is policed through controlling activities: outsiders cannot participate in the public activities definitive of citizenship. This creates potential dangers for certain groups of full members of the community. As the boundaries between citizens/subjects and citizens/outsiders coincide, the way the external boundary is policed will have an impact on the way the internal boundary is policed. In effect, any group that shares characteristics with those identified as outsiders will themselves be in a vulnerable position. Their membership will be constantly questioned; they will be subjected to forms of surveillance from which other members are free; and their access to the public sphere of citizenship will become hazardous. (Cole 2010, pp. 5–6)

To recap, Miller’s conception of a quasi-contract between receiving nations and immigrant groups raises two related concerns. The first is that, by being open-ended, the requirement for integration leaves immigrant groups open to arbitrary critique for being insufficiently integrated and untrustworthy citizens of their adopted countries. The second is that, by focusing on national culture and not citizenship, Miller’s proposal inadvertently makes political membership appear as secondary in the discussion of political trustworthiness. This is likely to lead to various kinds of arbitrary exclusion whereby full members of the political community are deemed as untrustworthy citizens merely by virtue of sharing in a presumably foreign religious, ethnic, or cultural background.

Could Miller’s conception address satisfactorily these two concerns? This question boils down to establishing whether the close link between a shared national identity and trust among fellow citizens gets right the relationship between trust and trustworthiness in public life. For if it doesn’t, the requirement for cultural integration which this conception places on immigrant groups will turn out to be not merely inefficient, but counterproductive. To see which of the two the case is, we need to place Miller’s account in the context of recent work on the nature and basis of interpersonal trust.

**Nature and basis of interpersonal trust**

It is important to note that the kind of trust Miller’s account is after is interpersonal rather than institutional. This is a theoretical choice. After all, it is not immediately apparent why public willingness to contribute to a welfare system should be seen as dependent primarily on
fellow citizens trusting one another rather than the institutions of their state. This is not a critical, but a clarification point meant to explain the relevance of the discussion to follow. For the models of interpersonal trust, upon which I shall draw, have not been developed specifically for political contexts, but are more general. This is not methodologically inappropriate since Miller’s conception of trust also reflects a broader range of cooperative interactions. As indicated earlier, on Miller’s view the need for high levels of interpersonal trust among fellow citizens arises because citizenship rights have a strong social component within a democratic welfare state. More specifically, the problem of trust between receiving nations and immigrant groups has to do with the fact that, on the one hand, citizenship ‘entails an equal claim to public goods’ and, on the other, ‘immigrants bring with them new demands for public goods’ (Miller 2008, p. 381). These new demands not only amount to more people having access to the same kind and level of public services. The creation of new public services might be also required. Examples include public subsidies for religious and cultural practices, such as sports that are prevalent within specific immigrant groups. A degree of cultural integration is therefore meant to forestall the perception that such groups come to take unfair advantage of a system of social cooperation put in place and maintained by the receiving nation. By integrating into the national culture, immigrants would not only show that they are committed citizens worthy of trust. They would also be able to take part in an open, democratic deliberation about the nature and scope of public goods, to which the people of their adopted country should have equal access. As this summary shows, Miller’s account of trust is not distinctly political. Instead, it aims to resolve a general problem of social cooperation – potential free-riding – in a context which is political, the relationship between nations and immigrants. And so, to ascertain whether this account is successful, we need to articulate and critically examine the ways in which it conceptualises the nature and basis of interpersonal trust. In this respect, two queries will be of particular import. First: Is Miller’s account of trust best understood in affective or cognitive terms? And second: On this account, is trust supposed to track trustworthiness or conversely – attract it? These

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4 John Locke’s conception of government as ultimate trustee or deputy of the people is a classic example of institutional as opposed to interpersonal understanding of political trust. See esp. §§ 221-222 and 240 of The Second Treatise (1960) where Locke expands on the idea that the people remain the ultimate judge of whether the government has breached their trust and lost its legitimacy as a result. See also Hardin (1999) and Harré (1999), which provide complementary perspectives on the distinction between interpersonal and institutional trust in politics. On the significance of the concept of trust in the history of modern political philosophy, see Gough (1973), esp. ch.7 ‘Political Trusteeship’. According to Gough, trust has become a central political concept for it provides, by means of a legal metaphor, a useful vehicle for the idea of an obligation which – although enforceable – is so not as a matter of strict law, but of good conscience. Miller’s account of trust as grounded in a quasi-contract stands in direct continuity with this tradition.
alternatives are not mutually exclusive. As we shall see in the following discussion, some accounts of trust (e.g. Hardin 1991, Pettit 1995) succeed in bringing together aspects of the affective and cognitive models. Similarly, the relationship between trust and trustworthiness could in principle run both ways: trust seems to be well placed when it responds to, just as when it elicits trustworthiness.

Affective vs. Cognitive Approaches to Interpersonal Trust

Here is the basic structure of trust that will be assumed in the subsequent analysis:

\[ x \text{ trusts } y \text{ to } \phi \text{ or to refrain from } \phi\text{-ing because of } z \]

Or:

A trustor trusts a trustee to perform or refrain from performing an action or set of actions on the basis of some reasons.

Drawing on Annette Baier’s analysis of trust as three-term relationship in her seminar paper ‘Trust and Antitrust’ (1986), the proposed structure has the advantage to offer a neutral meeting ground for alternative approaches. To anticipate: accounts, such as Jones (1996) and Thomas (1990) which consider trust to be fundamentally an affective attitude take the trustor’s attitude toward the trustee as a person to be more significant than the trustor’s epistemic relationship to the reasons that speak in favour, or indeed against, their trusting this person. Alternatively, accounts, such as O’Neill (2002a) and Holton (1994) which consider trust to be a kind of belief responsive to evidence take the latter epistemic relationship to be more significant than the trustor’s attitude toward the person of the trustee. To see more clearly what the stakes are in fleshing out an account of political trust in either affective or cognitive terms, let us briefly discuss some clear-cut examples of each approach and then return to Miller’s proposal.

In ‘Trust as an affective attitude’, Karen Jones (1996, p. 4) defines trust as follows: ‘…trust is an attitude of optimism that the goodwill and competence of another will extend to cover the domain of our interaction with her, together with the expectation that the one trusted will be directly and favourably moved by the thought that we are counting on her’. This attitude of optimism seems inseparable from a kind of benign cognitive bias. As Jones puts it (p. 12):

Trustin thus functions analogously to blinked vision: it shields from view a whole range of interpretations about the motives of another and restricts the inferences we will make about the likely
actions of another… What in the absence of trust would be taken to be a reason for jealousy, for wary suspicion, or for action to protect my interests will not be so taken when there is trust. It is because the one trusted is viewed through the affective lens of trust that those who trust are – usually cheerfully, and often on the basis of the smallest evidence – willing to risk depending on the one trusted.

This feature of the affective model, linking trust to a benign cognitive bias, is taken a step further by Laurence Thomas who argues for a robust distinction between trust and predictability. According to Thomas, the more certain we are that a person cannot fail to act in a particular way, the less able we become to trust her with respect to this behaviour (1990, p. 247). This is because the point of interpersonal trust is not to make sure that people fulfil some specific obligations toward one another, but to offer a different and more compassionate way of living together. As Thomas points out (p. 249):

when there is affectional trust between individuals, then they look to one another to diminish the misfortunes that they suffer, and it is irrelevant whether the misfortune is such that from an objective and universal standpoint anyone else in the position to help would incur a moral obligation to do so.

In so doing, Thomas articulates the close link between two sides of the affective model of trust, which at first blush might appear as independent: the relative insignificance of evidence for or against the trustworthiness of the trusted and a departure from a morality expressed in terms of rights and obligations. Having established this link, he concludes:

…a world where trust abounds – and so one where trust prevails between people across differences in ethnic and religious heritage and differences in phenotype – is one where people contribute to one another’s flourishing by affirming each other’s moral worth.
(Thomas 1990, p. 250)

In contrast, trust and evidence of trustworthiness are meant to go hand in hand on a cognitive model. This is because on this alternative model trust fundamentally boils down to a judgement about the trustee’s trustworthiness. As Onora O’Neill (2002a, p.64) succinctly puts it by reflecting on the apparent crisis of trust in public life in the UK:

A crisis of trust cannot be overcome by a blind rush to place more trust. Our ambition is not to place trust blindly, as small children do, but with good judgment. In judging whether to place our trust in others’ words or undertakings, or to refuse that trust, we need information and we need the means to judge that information. To place trust reasonably we need to discover not only which claims or undertakings we are invited to trust, but what we might reasonably think about them.

From this perspective, if trust is either predicated upon, or leads to a cognitive bias, this would not be considered as benign, even less as a defining feature of trust. In fact, any
mismatch between trust and evidence of trustworthiness is deemed as problematic as that between a belief and the available evidence in support of this belief. What is more, the problem at hand is conceived primarily as a cognitive failure on the part of the trustor rather than an ethical fault which may sometimes lie with the trustor, e.g. for failing to trust the trustworthy, but also with the trustee, e.g. for betraying or exploiting a person’s trust. Given that one of the main issues raised by Miller’ proposal is how to avoid the default treatment of immigrants as untrustworthy, let us focus on how a cognitive model of trust would tackle instances where trust is unreasonably refused to trustworthy others. According to O’Neill, such instances, including ‘misplaced mistrust, unwarranted suspicion and misjudged refusal to trust, even where there is adequate – if inevitably imperfect – evidence of trustworthiness’ represent variations of the so-called Cassandra problem (2002b, p.141). For Cassandra’s prophecies, albeit always correct, were persistently ignored by the Trojans, ultimately at their peril. O’Neill illustrates this problem with public distrust levelled at research that involves testing on animals in the UK: not only is the practice strictly regulated, there is sufficient evidence that lab animals are treated humanely, and it is made available to the public. Yet, this evidence is widely ignored and testing on animals seen with suspicion, if not flatly condemned. To correct this kind of cognitive bias, O’Neill suggests that instead of further transparency, a regime of intelligent accountability is implemented (2002a, pp. 41–59). This is because, once a Cassandra problem develops, the sheer increase of available data in support of the mistrusted party trustworthiness becomes counterproductive. For the problem does not derive from want of evidence, but error of judgement. According to O’Neill, to rectify this would require, first, getting clearer about the expectations placed on the potential trustee and, second, agreeing on a clear procedure whereby everyone can see that these expectations are reasonably met.

Clearly, this solution heads in the opposite direction of what is suggested by an affective model of trust. As seen earlier, Thomas (1990) makes a case for an ethical relationship where interpersonal trust flows from the mutual recognition of one another’s moral worth. To do so, it consciously departs from the language of rights and obligations. By contrast, intelligent accountability is about specifying mutual expectations in terms of rights and obligations and putting in place formal structures, by dint of which obligation-bearers are held accountable and right-holders prevented from mistrusting them for no good reason (O’Neill 2005).

Miller’s proposal contains elements of both models of trust. In itself, this might seem unsurprising. For the proposal is based on the notion of a quasi-contract and so neither aspires
to fully transcend the language of rights and obligations in line with a purely affective approach, nor to comprise all relevant normative requirements in terms of rights and corresponding obligations in line with a purely cognitive approach. Yet, given that these two approaches recommend what seem to be incompatible measures for building and sustaining interpersonal trust, the prospects of bringing them together into a coherent mid-way position look rather dubious. These suspicions are further confirmed if we look at the distribution of affective and cognitive aspects of trust within Miller’s proposal. For the general idea that high levels of trust among fellow citizens are required for a successful welfare democracy flows from an affective model. As Jones would have put it, fellow citizens should view one another ‘through the affective lens of trust’ in order to support redistributive policies across different groups instead of essentially trying to promote their own interests. However, this general model of trust is not extended to immigrant groups: unlike members of the national majority, immigrants are meant to show themselves worthy of trust by integrating into this majority’s culture. Again, in itself this requirement does not seem to be objectionable. The problem arises from the fact that it can be consistently put only within a purely cognitive model of trust. In particular, if the requirement for cultural integration placed on immigrants remains partly unspecified as suggested by the terms of the quasi-contract favoured by Miller, there will be no way to avoid an instance of the Cassandra problem. Neither will receiving nations be sufficiently reassured that immigrants are committed citizens, nor will immigrants be confident of ever being fully accepted. What is more, the very fact that interactions with immigrant groups are conceptualised on a separate model of trust, not the general one covering interactions among fellow citizens is just as problematic. For instance, Miller argues that immigrants should engage in activities associated with good as opposed to minimal citizenship in order to fulfil the quasi-contractual obligation to integrate into the culture of their adopted country (2008, p. 381). Yet, no such requirement is explicitly placed on longer-established groups. Their members seem to be either exempt from it or, more likely, assumed to be good citizens by virtue of their – allegedly unproblematic – belonging to the national culture. This co-existence of a general model of trust among citizens, which is implicitly affective, with another model applicable to immigrants, which is primarily cognitive, has even more insidious implications than a Cassandra problem. To see why this is so, let us turn to the second main query about interpersonal trust, we identified earlier:

Is trust supposed to track or attract trustworthiness?
Drawing on the preceding discussion, it becomes apparent that the affective and cognitive models take opposite views on the relationship between trust and trustworthiness. Conceived as an affective attitude, trust is meant to attract, not track trustworthiness. For, as we saw earlier, this kind of trust is inseparable from the ‘expectation that the one trusted will be directly and favourably moved by the thought that we are counting on her’ (Jones 1996, p.4). In other words, by showing trust, we help motivate trustworthy behaviour. By contrast, conceived as a cognitive attitude, trust is meant to track, not attract trustworthiness. In fact, this kind of trust is practically indistinguishable from forming only clear and reasonable expectations. Having said that, cognitive trust can also facilitate trustworthy behaviour, albeit indirectly, that is by removing obstacles, such as misplaced mistrust and other manifestations of the Cassandra problem. Similarly, affective trust is not resistant to evidence to the point of becoming licence to deceive. And so, there seems to be room for coherent hybrid models of trust that build on the strengths of both approaches. Yet, Miller’s proposal does not appear to be successful in this respect. Instead, it is likely to lead to what I termed earlier political circumstance of self-fulfilling distrust. To make clearer the target of this critique, it would be helpful to briefly look at two earlier papers in which Miller succinctly articulates the role of a shared national identity. Consider the following pair of statements:

(1) Deliberation can only succeed where there exists a fairly high level of mutual trust in the deliberating body, which is why I argue that a shared national identity is close to being a necessary prerequisite.
(Miller 2003a, p. 365)

(2) We may disagree politically with the other side, we may even despise much of what they stand for … we know that they still have a good deal in common with us – a language, a history, a cultural background. So we can trust them at least to respect the rules and spirit of democratic government.
(Miller 2003b, p. 117)

What we see here is a one-way relationship of dependence, which runs from common background to mutual trust, to successful democratic interactions. For, as emphasized in (2), disagreement and diversity are potentially problematic and erosive of interpersonal trust. And

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5 Examples include Hardin (1991) and Pettit (1995). Hardin’s account has the merit of demonstrating how some refusals to trust – although justified in cognitive terms, e.g. when the potential cost of misplacing trust is relatively high – are not fully rational, for they prevent the distrustful person from engaging in potentially trusting relationships. Pettit’s account elucidates the effectiveness of openly placing one’s trust in others, e.g. ‘I count on you!’ and explains this phenomenon as ‘the cunning of trust’, based partly on evidence and prediction, partly on our sense of common humanity.
so, the task of a common background is, as it were, to absorb intractable disagreements which in the absence of such background would presumably result in a loss of mutual trust between citizens who find one another’s political views by and large contemptible. But why would a common background in general or a shared national identity in particular, to weave statement (1) in, be deemed conducive to mutual trust in the first instance? Looking at statement (2) again, it becomes clear that the knowledge of having a good deal in common is expected to function more like a shield against endemic suspicion rather than to sustain interpersonal trust. On this picture, the idea that a shared national identity seems to provide fellow citizens with the implicit assurance that no one is capable of disappointing the other too much, or in a too unpredictable a way. To the extent that this is still a model of interpersonal trust, it would be one where trustworthiness is conceived as, if not replaced by predictability.

If this conjecture is correct, the problem Miller’s proposal is trying to solve turns out to be misconceived. That is to say, a shared national identity which is apparently called for in order to boost interpersonal trust weakened by cultural diversity might in fact be required in order to cover for a diminishing trust in the national institutions. Arguably, the very demand for high levels of interpersonal trust could indicate a widespread institutional failure, that to provide well-structured cooperative environments where trust across different groups is the standard. To explain this phenomenon, Niklas Luhmann (1988, p. 98) draws a distinction between trust and confidence:

The normal case is that of confidence. You are confident that your expectations will not be disappointed… Trust, on the other hand, requires a previous engagement on your part. It presupposes a situation of risk… The distinction between confidence and trust thus depends on perception and attribution. If you do not consider the alternatives (every morning you leave the house without a weapon!), you are in a situation of confidence. If you choose one action in preference to others in spite of the possibility of being disappointed by the action of others, you define the situation as one of trust.

On this view, trust is reserved for identifiable parties and relationships, whereas confidence has to do with the context in which the parties meet and relationships take place. Luhmann’s distinction between trust and confidence has an important implication for the present discussion: the lack of confidence and the resulting demand for trust tend to form a vicious

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6 See, for instance, Offe (1999), according to which trust among fellow citizens is supported by trust in the democratic institutions, not the other way around. The subsequent discussion draws on this account, especially on the contrast between democratic institutions and national identity as alternative foundations of trust among citizens.
circle whereby trust becomes impossible. To illustrate this point, Luhmann considers a case of a corrupt legal system. Doing business within such a system is incredibly risky. The danger of being cheated is great, for any contractual obligations would be practically unenforceable. And so, lack of confidence in the relevant institutions would be very well-founded. Furthermore, it would make trust among business partners vital. However, it would also make it inadvisable. Given the corrupt institutional framework which allows for untrustworthy behaviours to pay off even in the long run, not only one off transactions, why should anyone trust anyone else?\(^7\) When confidence is lacking, no one can afford to trust the others, although they all sincerely share an interest in high levels of interpersonal trust.

Let us look again at Miller’s presentation of the problem of trust within a democratic welfare state. If Miller is correct that citizenship alone cannot ground interpersonal trust within such a state and so citizens have to rely on sharing a cultural identity ‘of the kind that common nationality provides’, the situation described will be relevantly similar to the vicious circle of wanting confidence and needed trust that we just considered. In terms of the preceding discussion, trust would not be able either to track or to attract trustworthiness. Instead, it would be tasked with an impossible mission – to compensate for the lack of propitious institutional settings. For, when such settings are not sufficiently established, interpersonal distrust becomes the default position. What is more, since the focus of political attention shifts away from public institutions to private citizens, this kind of distrust is likely to turn self-fulfilling. As Diego Gambetta (1988, p. 234) observes:

> Trust is a peculiar belief predicated not on evidence but on the lack of contrary evidence – a feature that … makes it vulnerable to deliberate destruction. In contrast, deep distrust is very difficult to invalidate through experience, for either it prevents people from engaging in the appropriate kind of social experiment, or, worse, it leads to behaviour which bolsters the validity of distrust itself. Once distrust has set in, it soon becomes impossible to know if it has ever in fact been justified, for it has the capacity to be self-fulfilling, to generate a reality consistent with itself. It then becomes individually ‘rational’ to behave accordingly, even for those previously prepared to act on more optimistic expectations.

To reflect the political origins of the kind of self-fulfilling distrust at issue here – as argued earlier, it derives from considering citizenship insufficient for trust among citizens – it seems

\(^7\) Cf. Williams (1995, p. 116): ‘Co-operation requires trust in the sense that dependent parties need some degree of assurance that non-dependent parties will not defect, … in general, people will not trust others enough to bring about co-operation unless their assurance is to some extent well based: that is to say, unless in fact people are generally motivated, one way or another, not to defect if they are in a non-dependent position.’
apt to term it ‘political circumstance of self-fulfilling distrust’. To the extent that it presents a failure to trust when trust is both appropriate and required, the political circumstance of self-fulfilling distrust is similar to the Cassandra problem. However, in the political case, this failure goes well beyond a cognitive bias, for it has a distinctly prejudicial effect on some potentially marginalised groups of citizens. This is a direct consequence of associating trust among citizens with sharing a national culture as opposed to citizenship. For citizens deemed insufficiently integrated into this culture would be held responsible for a deficit of interpersonal trust that is in fact most detrimental to them as they are the ones whose trustworthiness would be routinely questioned. What is more, they would have little chance for redress. As it emerged from the preceding discussion, volunteering evidence of trustworthiness, such as successful cultural integration is unlikely to help. Only trust can attract trustworthiness, not the other way around.

**National culture and Non-domination**

Miller’s conception of interpersonal trust based on a shared national culture has attracted wide critical interest. For instance, Matthew Festenstein argues in a recent paper that this conception ‘fails to specify how trust in the public sphere is to be generated, in the circumstances of disagreement that give rise to the need for political deliberation and democratic decision in the first place’ (2009, p. 292). Nevertheless, Festenstein concedes: ‘Sharing an identity may eliminate some sources of distrust – but so may sharing other sorts of non-national identity, such as ethnicity and religion. But this shared identity only serves to create a space within which the politics of trust still has to be negotiated by those concerned’ (p. 293).8

The conclusion supported by Festenstein’s argument is that Miller’s conception is inefficient in the promotion of trust. The line of critique pursued here went a step further to suggest that this conception creates a political circumstance of self-fulfilling distrust. So far, I have argued for this claim primarily by reflecting on the nature and basis of trust. In the remainder of this paper, I shall briefly remark on the role of national culture in Miller’s proposal. This will help bring into relief the distinctly prejudicial effect this proposal could have for potentially marginalised groups of immigrants and citizens alike. The following argument partly draws on the account of epistemic injustice proposed by Miranda Fricker (2007) and more

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8 Abizadeh (2002) is another critical response to Miller, which helped shape the current analysis.
specifically, on the notion of identity-prejudicial credibility deficit. According to Fricker, such credibility deficit arises from the entrenched perception of certain groups as unreliable knowers, e.g. because they are deemed too lazy, or emotional, or stupid. As a result, they are considered as less trustworthy than the average. What is more, their intentions are treated as relatively insignificant. This is because what makes them unworthy of trust is their perceived lack of epistemic competence, not the suspicion that they might use such competence in order to deceive. The resulting credibility deficit can be seen as identity-prejudicial in two ways. First, it is based on a prejudice that attaches to some group identities, including that of women in sexist cultures and racial minorities in segregated societies. Second, it undermines the standing of those affected within the community of knowers.

A requirement to integrate into a national culture in order to become a trustworthy citizen might lead to a different kind of identity-prejudicial credibility deficit. What I have in mind is an asymmetrical expectation placed on presumed outsiders, but not insiders: that to accept a great deal of things about public life on blind trust, without a principled argument. This looks like an inescapable conclusion of the way national culture is conceptualised on Miller’s proposal. Sharing a cultural identity ‘of the kind that common nationality provides’ is presented as a prerequisite for successful democratic deliberation. At the same time, this identity is interpreted as separate from citizenship as shared political membership. So the national culture of a liberal democratic state is not conceived as a particular manifestation of some universal principles of political morality, but as an independent source of political normativity on a par with these principles. As a result, the requirement to partake into some cultural practices would be justifiable on purely conventional grounds, by appeal to the ‘done thing’ in this country. To appreciate the difference between conventional and principled justification, let us consider a helpful example offered by Nicholas Southwood (2011, p.778):

…if a Canadian’s judgement that one must bring a bottle of wine for one’s host when invited for dinner is grounded in part in a social practice of bringing a bottle of wine for one’s host when invited for dinner, this means that it somehow appears to the Canadian that the practice among Canadians of

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9 Drawing on Pettit (2001) Ch. 5, I assume that the credibility deficit at issue is inconsistent with freedom as non-domination. This is because, in Pettit’s terms, cultural outsiders, be they citizens or not, would lack the discursive control to counter arbitrary intrusions from insiders. Pettit describes a situation of shared discursive control as follows: ‘When we discourse, or reason together, about a theoretical or practical problem we recognise it as a common problem… Recognising it as a common problem, then, we search for considerations that we can recognise in common as relevant to its resolution, and we look for a resolution that we can agree in common is supported by those considerations’ (p. 67). Those who suffer from the kind of identity-prejudicial credibility deficit identified here are dominated by virtue of being excluded from the ‘we’ of shared discursive control.
bringing a bottle of wine for one’s host when invited for dinner is a non-derivative aspect of what justifies the requirement to bring a bottle of wine for one’s host when invited for dinner.

This non-derivative aspect of conventional justification might be seen as an advantage worth absorbing into a notion of national culture. For it could seem well-aligned with the idea of liberal neutrality: the social practices immigrants are expected to fit in are not presented as morally superior to the practices they are used to. Neither better, nor worse: just how things are done here. At a close look, however, this conceptualisation turns out to be problematic. This is because of the political significance attached to cultural integration on Miller’s view: it is a prerequisite for fully partaking in democratic deliberation, not the other way around. If so, perceived outsiders of the national culture cannot escape a lesser, if not entirely passive, role in the democratic process. For on some matters, it would seem appropriate not to convince them by means of a principled argument as it befits fellow citizens, but by appeal to how things are done here. What is more, alleged cultural outsiders who refuse to take such appeals on blind trust might find themselves even further marginalised, as unable to integrate in, if not hostile, to the nation’s culture.

To see why this is so, let us look again at Southwood’s example, the Canadian practice of bringing a bottle of wine for one’s host when invited for dinner. Scepticism about this practice would have different consequences for Canadians depending on whether their belonging to the national culture is widely recognised or questioned. The former would be free to express disagreement, if not contempt for the practice: ‘Bringing a bottle of wine when invited for dinner – what a silly thing to do! There are much better ways of showing friendliness and appreciation for one’s host!’ They might be criticised as eccentric, curmudgeon, or stingy. It is unlikely however that their national identity as Canadians will ever come to discussion. In contrast, a similar scepticism expressed by alleged cultural outsiders is likely to be seen not as a view worthy of critical discussion, but as a sign of their ignorance of, or disaffection with the Canadian ways. By construing national culture in conventional terms, independent of citizenship, we risk to ingrain this kind of identity-prejudicial credibility deficit at the level of democratic deliberation.
References


