Circumstance, Answerability and Luck. The Monist,Volume 104, Issue 2, April 2021, Pages 155–167, https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onaa029
Distinguishing Value-Neutrality from Value-Independence: Toward a New Disentangling Strategy for Moral Epistemology. Forthcoming in Mark McBride and Visa AJ Kurki (eds.), Without Trimmings: The Legal, Moral and Political Philosophy of Matthew Kramer. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pathologies of Agency. Forthcoming in L. Ferrero (ed.) The Routledge Handbook in the Philosophy of Agency
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice at 24 (with E Ceva). Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (2021) 24(1):1–3. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-021-10169-5
Revisiting Epistemic Injustice in the Context of Agency. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2020 23(5).DOI: 10.1007/s10677-020-10138-4
Dimensions of Responsibility. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2018 21(4): 771-773. DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9954-y (co-authored with E Ceva)
Responsibility for Reason-Giving: The Case of Individual Tainted Reasoning in Systemic Corruption. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2018 21(4): 789–810. DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9950-2 (co-authored with E Ceva)
A Novel Theoretical Framework to Address the Gap between Universal Guidelines and International Variations in the Threshold for Abdominal Aortic Aneurysm Surgery. Annals of Vascular Surgery 2018 53: 275-277 (co-authored with R Lee, KWM Fulford and A Handa)
Aiming at the Truth and Aiming at Success. Philosophical Explorations 2017, 20: sup1: 111-126.DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2017.1287297.
Lessons from Akrasia in Substance Misuse: a Clinicophilosophical Discussion. BJPsych Advances, Jul 2016, 22 (4): 234-241. DOI: 10.1192/apt.bp.115.014845 (co-authored with KD Fletcher)
Autonomy in Psychiatric Ethics. In Sadler, J., van Staden, G. W. and Fulford, K. W. M. eds. The Oxford Handbook of Psychiatric Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 354-371.
David Hunter (ed.), Belief and Agency. The Philosophical Quarterly 2014 64(255): 377–380 ; doi: 10.1093/pq/pqu003
Immigration, Interpersonal Trust, and National Culture. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 2014, 17(1): 111–128
Addiction and Weakness of Will: An Integrated Account, Ch. 5 In L. Radoilska. Addiction and Weakness of Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013
Depression, Decisional Capacity and Personal Autonomy. In Fulford, K.W.M., Davies, M., Graham, G., Sadler, J., Stanghellini, G. and Thornton, T. (eds.). Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 1155–1170
Akrasia and Ordinary Weakness of Will. Topicos 2012, 43: 25–50
Autonomy and Ulysses Arrangements. In Radoilska, L. (ed.). Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 252–280
Personal Autonomy, Decisional Capacity, and Mental Disorder. In Radoilska, L. (ed.). Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp.xi–xliii
Three Challenges from Delusion for Theories of Autonomy. In Radoilska, L. (ed.) Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 44–74 (co-authored with KWM Fulford)
An Aristotelian Approach to Cognitive Enhancement. Journal of Value Inquiry 2010, 44(3): 365–375
Public Health Ethics and Liberalism. Public Health Ethics 2009, 2(2): 135–145
Truthfulness and Business. Journal of Business Ethics 2008, 79: 21–28
Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy. L'Année Sociologique 2004, 52(2): 625–629
Privacy and Public Expression. Cités 2003, 15: 31–4
https://doi-org.chain.kent.ac.uk/10.1007/s10677-018-9954-y
Distinguishing Value-Neutrality from Value-Independence: Toward a New Disentangling Strategy for Moral Epistemology. Forthcoming in Mark McBride and Visa AJ Kurki (eds.), Without Trimmings: The Legal, Moral and Political Philosophy of Matthew Kramer. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pathologies of Agency. Forthcoming in L. Ferrero (ed.) The Routledge Handbook in the Philosophy of Agency
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice at 24 (with E Ceva). Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (2021) 24(1):1–3. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-021-10169-5
Revisiting Epistemic Injustice in the Context of Agency. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2020 23(5).DOI: 10.1007/s10677-020-10138-4
Dimensions of Responsibility. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2018 21(4): 771-773. DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9954-y (co-authored with E Ceva)
Responsibility for Reason-Giving: The Case of Individual Tainted Reasoning in Systemic Corruption. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2018 21(4): 789–810. DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9950-2 (co-authored with E Ceva)
A Novel Theoretical Framework to Address the Gap between Universal Guidelines and International Variations in the Threshold for Abdominal Aortic Aneurysm Surgery. Annals of Vascular Surgery 2018 53: 275-277 (co-authored with R Lee, KWM Fulford and A Handa)
Aiming at the Truth and Aiming at Success. Philosophical Explorations 2017, 20: sup1: 111-126.DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2017.1287297.
Lessons from Akrasia in Substance Misuse: a Clinicophilosophical Discussion. BJPsych Advances, Jul 2016, 22 (4): 234-241. DOI: 10.1192/apt.bp.115.014845 (co-authored with KD Fletcher)
Autonomy in Psychiatric Ethics. In Sadler, J., van Staden, G. W. and Fulford, K. W. M. eds. The Oxford Handbook of Psychiatric Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 354-371.
David Hunter (ed.), Belief and Agency. The Philosophical Quarterly 2014 64(255): 377–380 ; doi: 10.1093/pq/pqu003
Immigration, Interpersonal Trust, and National Culture. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 2014, 17(1): 111–128
Addiction and Weakness of Will: An Integrated Account, Ch. 5 In L. Radoilska. Addiction and Weakness of Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013
Depression, Decisional Capacity and Personal Autonomy. In Fulford, K.W.M., Davies, M., Graham, G., Sadler, J., Stanghellini, G. and Thornton, T. (eds.). Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 1155–1170
Akrasia and Ordinary Weakness of Will. Topicos 2012, 43: 25–50
Autonomy and Ulysses Arrangements. In Radoilska, L. (ed.). Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 252–280
Personal Autonomy, Decisional Capacity, and Mental Disorder. In Radoilska, L. (ed.). Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp.xi–xliii
Three Challenges from Delusion for Theories of Autonomy. In Radoilska, L. (ed.) Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 44–74 (co-authored with KWM Fulford)
An Aristotelian Approach to Cognitive Enhancement. Journal of Value Inquiry 2010, 44(3): 365–375
Public Health Ethics and Liberalism. Public Health Ethics 2009, 2(2): 135–145
Truthfulness and Business. Journal of Business Ethics 2008, 79: 21–28
Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy. L'Année Sociologique 2004, 52(2): 625–629
Privacy and Public Expression. Cités 2003, 15: 31–4
https://doi-org.chain.kent.ac.uk/10.1007/s10677-018-9954-y